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CARNIVAL OF MIRRORS: LAURENCE 
TRIBE'S "UNBEARABLE WRONGNESS" 
Nelson Lund* 
Professor Tribe has now done to me just what I claim he did 
to the Supreme Court in eroG v. hsuB. 1 By repeatedly distorting 
what I actually said, Unbearable Wrongnesi creates illusory tar-
gets that Professor Tribe then holds up to ridicule. 3 In the very 
limited space that the editors have allotted, I could not possibly 
offer point-by-point responses to his many mischaracterizations 
of what I said in the two articles that he attacks.4 Nor will I try to 
catalo~ the arguments that he left unanswered in his lengthy re-
buttal. 
Instead, I will focus on our most significant points of dis-
agreement: whether the Court's rationale for the decision in 
Bush v. Gore suffers from an "almost embarrassing bank-
* Patrick Henry Professor of Constitutional Law and the Second Amendment 
and Foundation Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. 
I. Laurence H. Tribe, eroG v. hsuB and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from 
its Hall of Mirrors, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 170 (2001) ("Tribe, eroG v. hsuB"). 
2. Laurence H. Tribe, The Unbearable Wrongness of Bush v. Gore, 19 Const. 
Comm. 571 (2002) ("Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness"). 
3. Perhaps the most ridiculous thing I'm accused of saying is that Professor Tribe's 
eroG v. hsuB is "unexceptional." Id. at 572 & n.3. Fortunately for me, however, what 
Professor Tribe calls a "direct quotation" is an outright misquotation. In fact, I said al-
most the opposite, viz. that much of his essay is "quite unexceptionable." Nelson Lund, 
"EQUAL PROTECTION, MY ASS!"? Bush v. Gore and Laurence Tribe's Hall of Mir-
rors, 19 Const. Comm. 543,544 (2002) ("Lund, "EQUAL PROTECTION ... "?"). 
4. For just one illustrative example, consider the following passage: "Professor 
Lund attempts to dismiss the importance of Davis on the ground that it was merely a plu-
rality opinion. Apparently, the reader is supposed to believe that, because Davis com-
manded no clear majority, the case is not good law. I trust Professor Lund is kidding." 
Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 580 n.42 (cited in note 2). I invite the reader to compare 
this passage, and the rest of footnote 42, with what I actually said in Lund, "EQUAL 
PROTECTION ... "? at 553 n.35, 559-60 (cited in note 3). Nowhere did I say or imply 
that the absence of a majority opinion in Davis means that the case or decision is not 
"good law." Cf. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 576 & n.18 (cited in note 2) (attributing 
a statement in the plurality opinion in the Casey abortion case to "the Court itself'). 
5. For one example, see Lund, "EQUAL PROTECTION ... "? at 554-55 (cited in 
note 3) (criticizing Professor Tribe's defense of the Florida court's treatment of the par-
tial recount in Miami-Dade). 
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ruptcy,"6 and whether the Court was legally prohibited from de-
ciding the case at all. These are the important issues, and it is 
important to keep in mind that Professor Tribe's attacks on me 
are significant only because he desperately needs to show that 
any legal defense of the Court is silly. That is the only way to 
sustain his own claim that the Court was playing a shell game in 
Bush v. Gore/ or as he now says, that the Court's decision de-
serves to be greeted with "head-scratching incredulity."8 Profes-
sor Tribe's claim is not just that Bush v. Gore was wrongly de-
cided, but rather that no reasonable person could defend the 
decision. That is an extraordinarily serious accusation against the 
Court, and I say that the accusation is itself outrageous. 
I. EQUAL PROTECTION 
First, Professor Tribe ignores the distinction that I and all 
the Justices have drawn between what we may think is the 
"original meaning" of various constitutional provisions and what 
the Court's cases say they mean.9 Most importantly, neither I nor 
the Bush v. Gore majority argued that Reynolds v. Sims was 
rightly decided. 10 Notwithstanding Professor Tribe's repeated ef-
forts to saddle me with the deep perplexities that are attributable 
to the Reynolds line of cases, I have neither the power to change 
the opinion that Chief Justice Warren wrote, nor the power to 
overrule any decision. Unlike me, the Bush v. Gore Court did 
have the power to overrule the well-settled Reynolds line of 
cases. But neither Professor Tribe nor anyone else that I'm 
aware of has criticized Bush v. Gore for accepting this line of 
precedent. 
The real issue is whether the Court applied those prece-
dents correctly. I have argued that the decision in Bush v. Gore 
6. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 573 (cited in note 2). 
7. Tribe, eroG v. hsuB at 221-22 (cited in note 1) (quoted in part in Lund, 
"EQUAL PROTECTION ... "? at 543-44 n.2 (cited in note 3)). 
8. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness. at 571(cited in note 2). See also id. at 575 (charg-
ing that "the [equal protection] holding was "not just incorrect but utterly bizarre") (em-
phasis in original); id. at 601 n.118 (apparently claiming that the case contained no "col-
orable claims for federal relief'). 
9. If this has contributed to my being labeled "deeply, deeply, shallow," so be it. 
See id. at 572. 
10. I specifically called Justice Harlan's dissent in that case "devastating and unan-
swered," and I explained at some length why I agreed with a good part of Professor 
Tribe's analytical critique of the vote dilution theory that I say arose in and from Rey-
nolds. Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 
1219, 1262 (2002) ("Lund, Unbearable Rightness"); Lund, "EQUAL 
PROTECTION ... "? at 556-61 (cited in note 3). 
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flows easily from the Reynolds line, and I believe I'm right about 
that. But I do not claim that anyone who advances a different in-
terpretation of the Court's equal protection precedents must be 
greeted with the kind of mockery that Professor Tribe directs at 
the Supreme Court and me. 11 At least since the day the Court 
concluded that "the equal protection of the laws" means "the 
protection of equal laws,"1 the jurisprudence of this constitu-
tional provision has been a never-ending exercise in drawing ju-
dicially-created lines between permissible and impermissible 
forms of inequality. All, or almost all, of the Court's equal pro-
tection decisions can therefore be defended with some sort of 
reasoned argument, as well as criticized with some sort of rea-
soned argument. In this respect, Bush v. Gore is just like the 
others. 
But Professor Tribe has not contented himself with making 
a reasoned argument against the Court's application of its equal 
protection precedents. Instead, he has taken upon himself the far 
more difficult burden of demonstratin¥ that Bush v. Gore was 
"not just incorrect but utterly bizarre."1 Unless he can meet that 
burden, his indictment of the Court is highly irresponsible. And 
he does not meet the burden. Professor Tribe's first major criti-
cism of my defense of Bush v. Gore essentially boils down to 
this: the broad principle of equal protection that I quoted from 
Reynolds v. Sims 14 cannot imply that Bush v. Gore was right to 
"mandate[ ] precisely drawn and completely uniform standards 
for recounting electoral ballots"15 because such a constitutional 
requirement would lead to a host of inconsistencies and even ab-
II. See Lund, "EQUAL PROTECTION ... "? at553 (cited in note 3) ("The nature 
of the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence has produced a huge range of 
cases in which a decision either way would be neither indisputably correct nor impossible 
to defend. Bush v. Gore falls within that range, though the Court's holding is extremely 
easy to defend."). 
12. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
13. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 575 (cited in note 2) (emphasis in original). 
14. "Weighting the votes of citizens differently, by any method or means, merely 
because of where they happen to reside, hardly seems justifiable. One must be ever 
aware that the Constitution forbids 'sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of dis-
crimination."' 377 U.S. at 563 (citations omitted). As I have already explained at length, 
the Reynolds opinion as a whole confirms that the Court was relying on a principle that 
went well beyond the malapportioned legislative districts that were directly at issue. See 
Lund, Unbearable Rightness at 1244-51 (cited in note 10); Lund, "EQUAL 
PROTECTION ... "? at 551-53 (cited in note 3). 
15. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 572 (cited in note 2) (emphasis added). See 
also id. at 586 (apparently implying that the Court and I maintain that "the Constitution 
requires that all ballots be treated identically" (emphasis in original)); id. at 587-88 
(claiming that the Court demanded that any right to vote for President must be "per-
fectly uniform"). 
612 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY (Vol. 19:609 
surdities.16 1t is true that the Court and I both interpret Reynolds 
to stand for a principle broader than the requirement of equi-
populous legislative districts. So does Professor Tribe, at least 
some of the tirne. 17 But neither the Court nor I interpreted Rey-
nolds to entail the many absurdities that would no doubt follow 
if it required perfect equality or complete uniformity. 
Professor Tribe's argument would have considerable merit 
if he had correctly described the holding in Bush v. Gore. But he 
has not. Bush v. Gore pointed to several different instances of 
serious, unjustified, and avoidable nonuniformity in the recount 
ordered by the Florida court, and concluded that the recount or-
der did not satisfy "the minimum requirement for nonarbitrarX 
treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right." 8 
The Court certainly did say that the formulation of uniform rules 
was practicable and necessary,19 but it never said that these rules 
must be "precisely drawn" or "completely" uniform. Whether 
one agrees with the Court's equal protection analysis or not, no-
body should put these words into the Court's mouth, as Profes-
sor Tribe does, and then mock the Court for having said some-
thing utterly bizarre and foolish. 
Recognizing that "the problem of equal protection in elec-
tion processes generally presents many complexities,"20 Bush v. 
Gore refrained from trying to elaborate a comprehensive set of 
rules for determining exactly how much and what kinds of non-
uniformity are constitutionally proscribed in each of the various 
factual contexts that can arise in counting ballots. I think the 
Court's decision to rule narrowly made good sense, for reasons 
that I have already explained in detail.21 Someone else might ar-
16. See, e.g., id. at 587 (" ... Bush v. Gore appears to put states in a Catch-22: the 
failure to specify a uniform statewide substandard for recounting may risk invalidation 
under the 'arbitrariness' principle, while the decision to specify such a substandard may 
inadvertently treat ballots unequally.") (emphasis in original). 
17. See, e.g., Tribe, eroG v. hsuB at 224 (cited in note 1) ("No one doubts that the 
Reynolds line would prevent a state from adopting a system in which those who tally ma-
chine-rejected ballots manually are instructed to toss out ballots with ambiguous marks 
indicating an intent to vote for Bush but to count all the votes for Gore."). See also Lund, 
"EQUAL PROTECTION ... "? at 550-53 (cited in note 3) (discussing Professor Tribe's 
inconsistent statements about the breadth of Reynolds' reach). 
18. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,105 (2000). 
19. ld. at 106. 
20. Id. at 109. 
21. Lund, Unbearable Rightness at 1267-69 (cited in note 10). It could hardly be 
maintained that the Court had some kind of obligation to answer the myriad questions 
that undoubtedly do remain open after Bush v. Gore. It is typical, rather than unusual, 
for equal protection rulings to generate many more questions than they answer. Familiar 
examples include Reynolds v. Sims and Brown v. Board of Education. 
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gue, without embarrassing himself, that the Court should have 
provided more detailed guidance for future cases. But that is not 
the argument that Professor Tribe advances. 
Instead, he insists that the Court was obliged to consider, 
sua sponte, hypothetical equal protection objections to the un-
derlying count in Florida, and then rule on the basis of "facts" 
that had never even been argued to the Court, let alone tested in 
a trial. His principal argument, as I understand it, is that the un-
derlying count was infected with uniformity problems at least as 
serious as those that the Supreme Court identified in the recount 
ordered by the Florida court.22 It may or may not be true that a 
properly litigated challenge to the underlying count should have 
resulted in its being invalidated under the equal protection stan-
dards relied on in Bush v. Gore. But we will never know, be-
cause Gore's legal team never even argued (let alone proved) 
that the underlying count suffered from uniformity problems 
comparable to those in the court-ordered recount.23 
One must ask why the brief that Professor Tribe filed in the 
Supreme Court didn't articulate such an objection-one which 
Professor Tribe now finds so compelling-in response to the 
Bush team's equal protection arguments. Perhaps it had some-
thing to do with the fact that Professor Tribe's brief did object to 
allowing his opponents to challenge the underlying count.24 But 
let us assume that Gore's legal team could not have been ex-
pected to realize the importance of comparing the nonuniformity 
in the court-ordered recount with that in the underlying count 
until after the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore. Even on that 
generous assumption, Gore got that chance after the U.S. Su-
preme Court remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court: 
he could have argued to the Florida court that equal protection 
problems in the underlying count required a new recount consis-
22. See Tribe, eroG v. hsuB at 254-63 (cited in note 1). 
23. In support of his suggestion that this issue was somehow before the Supreme 
Court, Professor Tribe cites only an amicus curiae brief. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 
589 n.79 (cited in note 2). I'll spare the reader a disquisition on the differences between 
parties and amici. Quite apart from that issue, the amicus brief cited by Professor Tribe 
made no effort to compare the inequalities in the underlying count with those in the 
court-ordered recount. Indeed, and notwithstanding Professor Tribe's description, the 
brief did not discuss the Florida election dispute at all. 
24. Brief of Respondents at 35, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), ("Petitioners' 
Fourteenth Amendment arguments rest principally on the assertion that, if the manual 
count proceeds, similar ballots will be treated dissimilarly in different parts of the State. 
We note that, insofar as this argument is directed at pre-contest tabulations, it is out of 
place here; petitioners should have raised such claims in an election contest of their 
own."). 
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tent with the equal protection standards recognized in Bush v. 
Gore. 
Professor Tribe does have a response of sorts, which is a 
corollary to his second major objection to the Court's decision. 
He claims that there was no remand, and the Court decided "to 
halt the entire political and legal process set in motion and de-
clare by fiat an end to the presidential election."25 Or, in an al-
ternative formulation, that the Court deserves strong criticism 
for its "particularly inexplicable failure to grasp the inconsis-
tency between its own equal protection holding and the remedy 
on which it settled. "26 
I agree that it would have been inappropriate for the Su-
preme Court to forbid the Florida court to attempt a new re-
count comporting with equal protection standards. The principal 
legal obstacle to such an attempt was the Florida court's own 
conclusion that state law set a deadline of December 12 (the 
very date of the Supreme Court's decision). That deadline was 
based on a questionable interpretation of the state statutes, and 
the Florida court should have been permitted to reconsider its 
interpretation of state law on remand. 
Once again, however, Professor Tribe's facially plausible 
objection to what the Court did is based entirely on attributing 
to the Court something it never said or implied. Contrary to Pro-
fessor Tribe's repeated misstatements, there was indeed a re-
mand.27 And contrary to Professor Tribe's undefended assump-
tion, the Supreme Court nowhere forbade the Florida court from 
ordering a new recount. I have already explained and defended 
this aspect of the Court's decision at great length, as Professor 
Tribe is well aware.28 His response is a footnote in which he says 
25. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 588 (cited in note 2) (footnotes omitted). 
26. Id. at 573. 
27. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111 ("The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida 
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion."). See Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 589 (cited in note 2) (alluding to the 
"woeful inadequacy of the Court's explanation for shutting down the recount rather than 
remanding the case to the Florida Supreme Court"); id. at 589 ("Under Lund's one-
person, one-vote theory, the only constitutionally permissible remedy was a remand."). 
28. Professor Tribe says that my "most recent work studiously avoids any mention 
of the (remedy] issue." Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 589 (cited in note 2). This is un-
true, as anyone can see by turning back to page 545 of this issue of Constitutional Com-
mentary. Not only did I mention the issue, I pointed out that I disagreed with Professor 
Tribe's claim that the Supreme Court forbade the Florida court from ordering a new re-
count on remand. And I gave the reader a citation to a lengthy discussion of my reasons 
for disagreeing with him. Lund, "EQUAL PROTECTION ... "? at 545 n.7 (cited in note 
3) (discussing and citing Lund, Unbearable Rightness at 1270-78 (cited in note 10)). It is 
true that I did not ask the editors of Constitutional Commentary to reprint that lengthy 
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"Au contraire," followed by a selective quotation from the 
Court's opinion.29 
"Au contraire" is not an argument. Nor does it, or the quo-
tation on which Professor Tribe relies, in any way refute my con-
trary arguments. In language omitted by Professor Tribe, the 
Court said that it could not remand for a new recount "[b]ecause 
the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature 
intended" to set a deadline of December 12.30 The Supreme 
Court was perfect!~ correct to defer to the state court's interpre-
tation of state law. 1 More important, however, the Court simply 
did not forbid the state court to change its interpretation of state 
law on remand, nor did the Court forbid a new recount based on 
such a reinterpretation. Professor Tribe's claim that the Supreme 
Court forbade the Florida court from ordering a new recount is a 
canard, plain and simple. 
Professor Tribe's co-counsel in Bush v. Gore, David Boies 
and Ronald Klain, have both acknowledged that the Supreme 
Court's opinion did not foreclose the Florida court from order-
ing a new recount.32 Professor Tribe should join them in doing 
discussion in this issue of the journal. Nor will I ask them to do so now. But Professor 
Tribe knows about this discussion. See Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 589 n.78 (cited in 
note 2). 
29. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 589 n.78 (cited in note 2). 
30. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111: 
Because the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature in-
tended to obtain the safeharbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5, Justice BREYER's 
proposed remedy-remanding to the Florida Supreme Court for its ordering of 
a constitutionally proper contest until December 18-contemplates action in 
violation of the Florida Election Code, and hence could not be part of an "ap-
propriate" order authorized by Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 102.168(8) (Supp. 2001). 
Professor Tribe should have been well aware of the importance of the language that he 
omitted when quoting part of this passage, for I had already objected to its being ignored 
by another commentator. See Lund, Unbearable Rightness at 1277 n.l82 (cited in note 
10). 
31. Professor Tribe is mistaken to say that my defense of Bush v. Gore somehow 
compels me to conclude that "deferring to the Florida Supreme Court's December 12 
deadline would plainly violate the Fourteenth Amendment." Tribe, Unbearable Wrong-
ness at 589 (cited in note 2). The Court was not obliged to somehow anticipate and ac-
cept Professor Tribe's unlitigated, post hoc claims, which were never presented to the 
Court, about a "dizzying array of arbitrary inequalities," id., in the underlying count. 
32. See Lund, Unbearable Rightness at 1277 n.l85 (cited in note 10) (cited in Lund, 
"EQUAL PROTECTION ... "? at 545 n.7 (cited in note 3)). See also 3 Engage: The 
Journal of the Federalist Society's Practice Groups 80-81 (Aug. 2002) (transcript of 
Lund/Kiain colloquy), where Mr. Klain agreed "as a legal matter" that the Florida court 
could have ordered a new recount on remand, while suggesting (quite reasonably in my 
view) that "as a practical matter" the Florida court was not likely to have accepted an 
invitation from the Gore team to do so: 
Nelson, I agree that the opinion did not preclude the possibility that the 
Florida Supreme Court could have had a remand proceeding and could have 
determined that the Supreme Court's conclusion in its opinion that the Decem-
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so. That will probably not happen, however, because Professor 
Tribe's whole complex edifice of argumentation collapses once 
one recognizes that he has again attributed to the Court a deci-
sion which does sound outrageous but which the Court never 
made. This point is sufficiently important that a special word of 
caution is required.33 By agreement, Professor Tribe will get the 
last word in this exchange of views in Constitutional Commen-
tary. If he uses that opportunity to challenge the detailed argu-
ments that I presented on this issue in Unbearable Rightness, I 
hope that interested readers will carefully compare whatever he 
says about my arguments with what I actually said. 34 
II. JUSTICIABILITY 
On justiciability, Professor Tribe has now abandoned the 
position that I called "spectacularly indefensible." Which is 
good. It would have been even better had he returned to the po-
sition that he took during the Bush v. Gore litigation. Unfortu-
nately, he has now invented yet a third theory, which is entirely 
new and which the Supreme Court could certainly not have been 
expected to anticipate. 
Space constraints preclude a critique of Professor Tribe's 
latest position, which essentially seeks to conflate the "passive 
virtues" theory of judicial restraint to which Justice Breyer ap-
ber 12th deadline was wrong. I absolutely agree with you that that possibility 
was open, and, in fact, on the night of December 12th, a number of us on the 
Gore team stayed up all night and wrote just such a brief inviting the Florida 
Supreme Court to do just that. 
I think as a practical matter, though, in this context, our view was that the 
Florida Supreme Court had gotten, you know, two increasingly intense candy-
grams from the U.S. Supreme Court and the second one seemed to have the 
word "stop" written on it in really big letters. It was our view that the Florida 
Supreme Court, which had divided four-three the past time around, was really 
not that interested in seeing us there one more time. 
So I take your point that as a legal matter, it was open to the Florida Su-
preme Court to write an opinion that said, "we know the Supreme Court said 
December 12th was the deadline, we know everyone in America thinks this is 
over now, but in fact, December 16th is the deadline and we're going to start 
the counting again." You know, it just seemed like the Supreme Court was 
sending a very strong signal not to do that. 
33. Indeed, this issue reappears in an important way even in the context of the po-
litical question doctrine, discussed below. Under Professor Tribe's new theory of the po-
litical question doctrine, it seems that if the Court had "rule[ d) out remedies that prema-
turely short-circuited the political process, and had remanded the case to the Florida 
Supreme Court to conduct a manual recount with uniform standards, it would at least 
have remained somewhat faithful to our constitutional tradition." Tribe, Unbearable 
Wrongness at 602 (cited in note 2). 
34. See Lund, Unbearable Rightness at 1270-78 (cited in note 10). 
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pealed35 with the legal doctrine of nonjusticiable political ques-
tions.36 It is worth stressing, however, the extent of Professor 
Tribe's concession. Not only does he admit that he cannot de-
fend the theory I attacked, he also seems to concede that his new 
theory has never previously been articulated by anyone. Most 
important, he now says that "it seems implausible that any reso-
lution of the ultimate legal battle over the propriety of the 
Court's intervention in the face of the political question doctrine 
could be described as plainly right or as plainly wrong. "37 In light 
of this statement, I would like to think that Professor Tribe will 
withdraw his sarcastic remarks about the Court's failure to ad-
dress a justiciability issue never raised by the parties,38 and per-
haps also his claim that the five "Justices in the Bush v. Gore ma-
jority have little but disdain for Congress as a serious partner in 
the constitutional enterprise, and not much patience with 'We 
the People' as the ultimate source of sovereignty in this repub-
lic. "39 
One other point deserves to be emphasized. Contrary to 
what Professor Tribe would have us believe,40 Justices Souter 
and Breyer absolutely did not say, imply, or even suggest that 
Bush v. Gore was nonjusticiable. Neither of them ever used the 
word "justiciable" or any of its cognates. Neither of them ever 
referred to the "political question doctrine." And neither of 
them cited any of the innumerable cases from this line of prece-
35. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 57-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing a Harlan 
Stone dissent and an extrajudicial remark by Louis Brandeis that was quoted in Alexan-
der Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch). 
36. Here again, and contrary to the insinuation in Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 
592 n.88, I have respected the distinction between my interpretation of the Constitution 
and the Supreme Court's case law. I believe that the Constitution can plausibly be inter-
preted to render cases like Bush v. Gore nonjusticiable. Whether it should be so inter-
preted seems to me a difficult question, and I have not been able to arrive at a settled 
opinion about that issue. The case law, however, is clear enough: McPherson v. Blacker 
answered the question, and that decision has not been overruled. The skimpy reasoning 
in the McPherson opinion is quite inadequate, and I have never said that the case was 
correctly decided. On the contrary, I have repeatedly cautioned against inferring that I 
think it was rightly decided. See Lund, Unbearable Rightness at 1234 n.53, 1254 n.l13 
(cited in note 10). As with the equal protection issue, my claim has been that the Court 
correctly applied its own precedents, and Professor Tribe does not contend that the 
Court was obliged to overrule McPherson. 
37. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 593 (cited in note 2). 
38. Tribe, eroG v. hsuB at 279 (cited in note 1) (quoted in Lund, "EQUAL 
PROTECTION ... "? at 562-63 (cited in note 3)). 
39. Tribe, eroG v. hsuB at 290 (cited in note 1) (quoted in Lund, "EQUAL 
PROTECTION ... "? at 569 (cited in note 3)). 
40. See Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 603 (cited in note 2) ("Contrary to Lund's 
utterly bizarre assertion, Justices Breyer and Souter plainly invoked the political question 
doctrine."). • 
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dents. Whatever kinship their position may have with Professor 
Tribe's newly minted "political process variant" of the political 
question doctrine, it is simply untrue that Souter or Breyer relied 
on what Professor Tribe calls "the traditional doctrine."41 
Both Justices plainly did believe that the Court should not 
have exercised its discretion to grant certiorari in this case, and I 
have no doubt that they would have been pleased to see the writ 
dismissed as improvidently granted. But they never said that the 
Court had violated the Constitution or any other legal rule by 
the very act of deciding the case.42 Professor Tribe's effort to 
suggest otherwise requires him to conflate the doctrine of non-
justiciable political questions (which Souter and Breyer did not 
invoke) with arguments (which Souter and Breyer clearly did 
make) about the proper exercise of judicial discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
As in most important constitutional cases, there was room 
in Bush v. Gore for reasonable disagreement about the best in-
terpretation of the applicable precedents. I think it was a very 
easy case, but my strong objections to Professor Tribe's position 
are not based on that conclusion. Rather, I object to the extrava-
gant terms in which he has denounced the Court, and to his 
claim that no reasonable defense of the Court's decision is possi-
ble. He is able to make that extremely serious charge sound 
plausible only by attributing to the Court absurd and irresponsi-
ble positions that it never took, and thereby creating an illusion 
of judicial outlandishness. Professor Tribe continues to paint the 
decision in this case as an outrage, and that is simply insupport-
able. 
41. See id. at 604 (" ... Justice Souter's argument invokes both the traditional doc-
trine and what I have called its political process variant"). Justice Ginsburg did allude to 
the "traditional doctrine," but only in criticizing Chief Justice Rehnquist's Article II 
analysis in his separate concurrence. 531 U.S. at 141-42 & n.2. 
42. Once again, Professor Tribe gets an assist from a misleading use of ellipses. See 
Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 605 (cited in note 2), where a careful review of the quo-
tation shows that Justice Breyer did not say that it was "legally wrong" for the Court to 
resolve the equal protection issue. Although Professor Tribe italicizes the term "legally 
wrong" in the quotation, Justice Breyer was not speaking there about the Court's deci-
sion to resolve the equal protection issue, but rather about what he believed was the 
remedy the Court ordered. Whether or not one agrees with Breyer's characterization of 
the remedy in the case, and whether or not one agrees with Breyer's prudential argu-
ments against deciding the case at all, the fact remains that neither he nor Justice Souter 
said or implied that the case was nonjusticiable. 
